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The Politics of the Comprehensive 
Approach
 
The Military, Humanitarian and State-building 
Discourses in Afghanistan1 

Introduction 
Over the last years there has been an increasingly vocal call for im-
proved coherence and coordination among the international commu-
nity engaged in Afghanistan. Facing a surge in violence, limited de-
velopmental and economical progress and a corrupt and inept domes-
tic political leadership, it is assumed that better coordination among 
the international actors will address many, if not all, these challenges.  
 
These efforts are usually coined ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘unity of 
effort’, integrated approach’ whole of government approach’ or simi-
lar. However, it has become evident that such coherence is extremely 
daunting task to achieve. The various actors’ strategies, motives, re-
sources, priorities, caveats, cultures and politics tend to differ signifi-
cantly. Hence, despite the seemingly united call for coherence and co-
ordination, the various initiatives and concepts do not necessarily per-
tain to the same thing, and as importantly, may hide strong competing 
political agendas beneath the surface. This article seeks to analyse 
these conflicts among the international actors with the aim of better 
understanding the obstacles as well as the potential for increased col-
laboration. 
 
Besides this, the article seeks to analyse these conflicts more in depth 
by sketching the outline of a discourse analysis. It will study how 
three discourses I have identified, the military, the humanitarian and 
the state-building discourses, meet in the same physical space (the Af-
ghan theatre) but have significant different perceptions of why they 
are there and what the ‘problem’ is in Afghanistan. I will argue that 
these deeper differences are the main impediments to a comprehensive 
approach. 
 
These differences are part of the very identity of the different set of 
actors. They often refer to intrinsic or embedded attitudes, percep-
tions, identities and ‘truths’ about Afghanistan and the international 
engagement there. Hence, the often visible ‘turf-battle’ between the 
three sets of actors is not only a result of pre-existing and diverging 
mandates or resources, it is also a result of deeper differences. It is the 
dynamics of these processes the discourse analysis can highlight, as it 
studies the formation of meaning, of normalities and social ‘truths’.  
Theoretical approach 
In the scope of this text I will define a discourse analysis relatively 
openly. I will consider it as an analytical tool designed to frame parts 
of the social world the researcher wishes to analyse. A discourse is 
therefore, just like any other categorisation, something we apply on 
the world in an attempt to re-present and analyse it in a specific way. 
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A discourse, as I see it, is the set of traditions, ways of thinking, per-
ceptions and normalities that defines and usually limits the possible 
scope of political action. Patterns of similar behaviour over time may 
be a result of this.  
 
However, the discourses are not fixed, there are no determinism this 
epistemology. Actors do break out of the general pattern of thinking 
and acting within a sector, sometimes they meet substantive resistance 
from mainstream sometimes not. What makes discourse an interesting 
analytical concept is that the mindsets, habits and traditions that 
makes a certain activity or way of thinking ‘normal’ also carries sig-
nificant power. The discourse is powerful in that it shapes the mindset 
and patterns of behaviour of many actors engaged in the same field of 
work or expertise. In Neumann’s (2008:63) words:  
 
‘Because a discourse maintains a degree of regularity in social relations, it pro-
duces preconditions for action. It constrains how the stuff that the world consists 
of is ordered, and so how people categorize and think about the world. It con-
strains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible, and what is 
thought of as the ‘natural thing’ to do in a given situation. But discourse cannot 
determine action completely. There will always be more than one possible out-
come. Discourse analysis aims at specifying the bandwidth of possible out-
comes’  
 
A good discourse analysis may open up political space, by challenging 
the givens, the implicit precondition a certain political activity rest on, 
and thereby making alternative political courses of action thinkable. 
My ambitions here are somewhat less ambitious. In the scope of this 
article the space limitations prevents a full-fledged discourse analysis 
as it should be. Rather, I will attempt to make a sketch of an analysis. 
The aim is simply to put three sets of discourses in the (post)war thea-
tre2 simultaneously up for analytical scrutiny. I will base the analysis 
of a handful of sources which I consider to be relevant and representa-
tive for the wider discourse, but it will still only be a snapshot of the 
discourses in question.  
 
What distinguishes this article from most other discourse analyses 
within IR, however, is the attempt to analyse three discourses at the 
same time. It is not about e.g. the ‘Western’ approach to a foreign 
country, such as Russia, to the ‘Orient’, or the Balkans.3 It is about 
three (predominantly) Western discourses. As a result this is not a 
                                                 
2  I use the term (post)war to indicate that in many of today’s conflicts there appears to be a 
fluid distinction between war and peace. Peace agreements often fail, the conflicts often 
take the form of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies with no distinct beginning or end to 
hostilities, and even presumably peaceful post-conflict situations often contain political 
tensions that easily re-evaporate into violence.  
3  See e.g. Iver B. Neumann, The Uses of the Other, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999; Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1979; Lene Hansen, 
Security as Practice, London: Routledge, 2006. 
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study about Western identity, delineating between a Western Self and 
some kind of (Russian, Oriental or Balkan) Other. The focus is rather 
an intra-western struggle between three discourses all carrying a 
Western ballast of values, history and principles. The fact that they are 
analysed in Afghanistan is of less relevance, Afghanistan is more of a 
stage (theatre), of the interplay than the focus of the study. Obviously 
context matters, and the nature Afghanistan complex will impact on 
the analysis. One must therefore be cautious when drawing general 
conclusions about the relationship between these discourses from this 
study. That, however, is nonetheless the ambition. It is not primarily a 
study about Afghanistan, but about the challenges related to coherence 
and a comprehensive approach between the three discourses. Some of 
the traits and key elements analysed here are thus likely to be found in 
other (post)war theatres as well.  
 
The three discourses share one feature; they see a need to be in Af-
ghanistan, they see a role for themselves. As such Afghanistan is 
something outside themselves, a place one intervene or enter into, it is 
something that legitimises the activity one does. Each discourse read 
Afghanistan and its ‘needs’ and define a policy in response. In ana-
lytical terms one may therefore define Afghanistan as an Other, not 
necessarily as an radical Other (an enemy) but as a place and a condi-
tion which is different from the Western. As we shall see, the three 
discourses focus on different aspects of the Afghanistan Other, based 
on how they see their own role. Their policy in Afghanistan is thus 
framed by how they see themselves, their own identity. The identity 
frames the policy, but conversely, the policy (i.e. what they do in Af-
ghanistan) is also reinforcing this very identity.  
 
Borrowing a fraction of Lene Hansen’s sophisticated discourse analy-
sis structure, I will discuss the spatial, temporal and ethical dimen-
sions of identity within each discourse. According to Hansen 
‘…space, time and responsibility are the big concept through which 
political communities – their boundaries, internal constitution, and 
relationship with the outside world- are thought and argued’.4 These 
three dimensions will thus be present in all discourses, but not neces-
sarily at equal strength. The purpose is partly to better understand how 
each discourse functions and evolves, but also to be able to point out 
some tensions within each discourse. I will particularly highlight a 
few of these tensions in each discourse, thus indicating that while co-
herence and comprehensive approach may be far off today, develop-
ments within each camp may open for new constellations in the future. 
 
I will start off with the Military Discourse, and compare three strands 
of the discourse, the conventional, stabilisation and counter-
                                                 
4  Lene Hansen 2006:46. 
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insurgency approaches, which all differ in several significant aspects. 
In the Humanitarian Discourse the orthodoxy of neutrality and impar-
tiality is still largely dominant, but even here some alternative voices 
are heard. Lastly, in the State-building Discourse, the Western tem-
plate state remains dominant, but the huge discrepancy between words 
and deeds threatens to undermine it, paving way for alternative politi-
cal developments.  
The Military Discourse 
The military discourse in Afghanistan is by far the most dominant of 
the three. The military is a distinct category of actors, visibly different 
from everybody else in their uniforms, vehicles and weapons. The 
armed forces also have distinct histories, corps cultures, theorising, 
rules and procedures. Analytically as well as empirically it sticks out. 
When applying the term discourse on this group the idea is thus to 
capture both what they do and what they think, and attempt to briefly 
analyse the military identity, the meaning of being in Afghanistan for 
the troops. To understand that one needs to look at how it defines it 
opponent, the enemy.  
The Conventional Warfare Approach 
Without entering military theory or philosophy of war, one may say 
that the military discourse always is based on a binary relationship 
with an adversary or enemy. Without a perceived threat, no need for a 
military. The same applies to Afghanistan. The military is there as a 
result of a perceived enemy or security threat, usually labelled Tali-
ban, Al-Qaida or insurgents. The military discourse in Afghanistan is 
based on the existence of this threat, and its organisation and conduct 
is a response it. The military identity is therefore per definition in a 
spatial relationship with an enemy. The military is composed to face 
an Other which is physically located outside the military itself. Tradi-
tionally this has been considered to be the armies of other (enemy) 
states, but guerrillas, insurgents and renegade groups have also been 
part of the Other for Western military discourse for centuries. After 
the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the USA declared itself at ‘war on terror’, 
thereby defining terrorism as a military, not police matter.5 Spatially 
the terrorist is harder to pin down than the traditional state-enemy, but 
Afghanistan was quickly pointed out as the location were terrorists 
had there ‘safe haven’ or ‘sanctuary’. The ‘war on terror’ had a locus. 
 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) begun in Afghanistan in October 
2001. Initially the aim of the war was to take control of Afghanistan 
                                                 
5  Jackson Maogoto Nyamuya: ‘War on the Enemy: Self-Defence and State-Sponsored Ter-
rorism’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 4 No. 2, 2003. 
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and oust the Taliban government. It was therefore in many ways a 
conventional invasion of a foreign country. After the coalition forces 
had ousted the Taliban’s military and governing structures, the focus 
switched to root out the remaining elements and the Al-Qaida leader-
ship which were hiding primarily in pockets in the mountainous bor-
der areas with Pakistan. The mandate of OEF included ‘the destruc-
tion of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, 
the capture of al-Qaeda leaders, and the cessation of terrorist activities 
in Afghanistan’.6 In spatial terms, it was about gaining full control of 
the territory, by rooting out the remaining resistance. The enemy 
Other was harder to see but still discernible as a distinct entity which 
could be eliminated through conventional means.7 
 
The conventional military identity has also a temporal dimension. In 
the conventional warfare as it was applied in Afghanistan, the enemy 
Other was clearly portrayed as being ‘backward’, ‘barbaric’, ‘tribal’ 
etc. Stories about the Taliban rule and its oppression of women, ban-
ning of music and pictures, conservative dress codes and other things 
were well known in the West prior to the invasion. The Western mili-
tary was therefore fighting an enemy which was considered primitive 
and undeveloped, embedded in a medieval interpretation of Islam. The 
enemy was thus not only violent towards the US and the West, but 
also toward its own people.  
 
Importantly, in this reading of the Taliban, they were considered un-
changeable. These were not considered enemies that would surrender 
or negotiate a peace agreement, it could not become a less radical 
Other through rational dialogue. As a result, the response of the Self is 
conventional warfare; engage the enemy, kill or capture him, destroy 
his infrastructure and use all means necessary.  
 
The ethical dimension is also an important foundation for the conven-
tional approach. The very legitimacy of the war was based on 9-11, an 
attack which for the Americans was shocking in its cruelty. It was 
considered ‘barbaric’ and ‘evil’, by President Bush and numerous 
other commentators. Hence, the subsequent war in Afghanistan was a 
war in defence of national security and dignity. It was considered to 
                                                 
6  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Enduring_Freedom. The legal foundation of OEF 
is the national right to self-defense under Art. 51 of the UN Charter and Resolution 1368 
passed by the UN Security Council. 
7  There are some nuances here between conventional warfare for territorial control and 
counter-terrorism or irregular warfare, where the aim is to kill or capture individuals in 
the terrorist-group’s leadership. The so-called ‘Afghan Model’ applied in e.g. the battle at 
the Tora Bora mountains was of the latter kind, and required somewhat different means 
than in regular warfare. However, in this context I will consider both approaches as con-
ventional as they are enemy-focussed, i.e. aimed at ridding the territory of enemy combat-
ants altogether. See also Peter John Paul Krause, ’The Last Good Chance: A Reassess-
ment of U.S. Operations at Tora Bora’, Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2008, pp. 664-
684. 
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be just and necessary, a moral response from the free world against 
the ‘enemies of freedom’, to paraphrase President Bush.8  
 
In contrast, the enemy was considered ethically inferior, by applying 
terrorism against innocent civilians as well as its own people. The 
above-mentioned backwardness was also reflected in an impression of 
them as religious fanatics without compassion or human features. In 
terms of war, they ignored Western rules of engagement, applied ter-
rorism, suicide bombers and road side bombs.  
 
It was indeed a radical Other. As a result the conventional military 
identity was reinforced, it had a mission, it was boosted nationally and 
politically, but also morally, the stark contrast to the enemy made the 
US military Self superior also ethically. Based on all this, the underly-
ing theory for the conventional approach was that the enemy was 
beatable with conventional means. The military had a mission which 
was achievable, and which reinforced the military as an efficient, nec-
essary and just force. Cooperation or coordination with other actors in 
the field was thus never considered a necessary endeavour, as in all 
conventional war it is fought by soldiers.  
The Stabilisation Approach 
The Stabilisation Approach is represented by ISAF and in particular a 
number of European countries’ which consider Afghanistan to be a 
limited threat to their own national security. Rather, they consider 
ISAF to be a matter of NATO solidarity, and are there in support of 
their most important ally, the US. Furthermore, they tend to regard 
Afghanistan primarily as weak state, where the role of ISAF is to sup-
port the UN and the government until it can stand on its own.  
 
NATO and ISAF formally entered Afghanistan in 2001, but did only 
expand beyond Kabul in 2003-06.9 Already from the NATO and 
ISAF’s mandate one can distinguish a certain different flavour than in 
the OEF approach discussed above:  
 
                                                 
8  See e.g. http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Enemies_of_freedom. The UN Se-
curity Council did not authorize the war though. 
9  This expansion process took several years, and was only completed in July 2006, when 
ISAF formally covered the entire country, and some of the troops under OEF command 
were transferred to ISAF. Gradually ISAF has grown in troop numbers as well as in con-
tributing nations. Today the numbers are about 71 000 troops from 43 contributing na-
tions. However, 30 of these countries provide 500 or less troops. The second largest con-
tributor, the UK, has 9000 troops, the third, Germany, have 4350 troops. In comparison 
the US have 35000 ISAF troops (and another 19 000 or so in OEF). So this needs to be 
taken into consideration when discussing approaches other-than-the-US; they are signifi-
cantly smaller in number and impact. 
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‘NATO’s main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan Government in exer-
cising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the 
way for reconstruction and effective governance.’10 
 
Whereas the wording here is not in contradiction to the OEF approach, 
terrorists and insurgents are hardly mentioned in the key ISAF docu-
ments. The European approach represents a different view of the pur-
pose of being in Afghanistan and also of the role of the military. 
Again we can analyse the identity along the three dimensions 
 
To some extent the stabilisation approach is similar to the conven-
tional one when it comes to space. The spatial dimension where the 
enemy is considered to be physically located somewhere ‘out there’ is 
therefore shared. The expansion of ISAF into the districts therefore 
made sense from a military point of view. The aim was to assist the 
implementation of authority of the central government through the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), so that it one day will con-
trol the entire territory. The ‘enemy’ is therefore all those resisting this 
expansion of the authority of the government in Kabul, the govern-
ance and the security forces. These Others can be criminals, rival 
clans, warlords or the Taliban11. They are a threat to the spatial order 
ISAF seek to establish, but are more widely defined than the enemies 
in the conventional approach and therefore not so easy to single out in 
space. For the stabilisation approach, the spatial dimension is there-
fore sometimes troublesome. Where is the enemy?  
 
Nonetheless, this reading of the mission and the mandate fits well into 
the European stabilisation strand that considers itself to be less of war-
fighters and more as robust peacekeepers. The identity is to a lesser 
extent defined in a dichotomy to an enemy. As the ‘problem’ is de-
fined primarily to be the weak state, the objective is to help stabilise 
this state, support the reconstruction process and help building a secu-
rity apparatus. The European countries in this camp typically have 
limited post-WWII war fighting experience, but have contributed in 
UN Peacekeeping missions and in the NATO and EU operations in 
the Western Balkans. These experiences form the main points of ref-
erence and identity for international operations for the armed forces, 
the government and not least the home public.  
 
The stabilisation approach therefore carries with it an important ele-
ment in the temporal dimension. They are in Afghanistan to assist and 
bring about change. It might recognise that there are ‘backward’ hard-
line Taliban who never will change, but the focus is less on these than 
on the occasional ‘spoiler’, i.e. violent resistance to the order being 
                                                 
 10  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm, accessed 17 July 2009. 
11  A global Al-Qaida threat does hardly exist in ISAF vocabulary. 
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implemented by ISAF and the local authorities and security forces. 
The stabilisation approach considers its role to support a transforma-
tion process, to help creating security in which civilian progress can 
take root. The military identity is thus funded on an idea of progress of 
the host-nation, of a transformation of a non-alien Afghan Other into 
an almost-Self. It is not about the elimination of a hard-line enemy of 
the past.  
 
This contrast to the conventional approach is even more visible in the 
ethical dimension. While the conventional approach legitimises itself 
in dichotomies of ‘good’, and ‘just’ vs. ‘bad, ‘unjust’ and ‘freedom 
haters’, the stabilisation approach seek to play down such language 
and references to war, and instead emphasis support for the Afghan 
government and the UN.  
 
The clearest example of this camp is the NATO country which per-
haps is most sensitive to combat operations, namely Germany. While 
being the third biggest troop contributor to ISAF, it is deployed in the 
relatively calm Northern provinces, where the daily operations are 
mostly focussed on stabilisation and reconstruction. The main reason 
for Germany’s reluctance to war is the home public’s general aversion 
against war fighting.12 Offensive military operations far away are of-
ten met with scepticism and resistance, war is often considered as 
something of the past, which is outdated or unnecessary in today’s 
world.13 A Der Spiegel article summarises it like this: 
 
German soldiers have carried sandbags in flooded cities like Dresden, helped 
Serbian mothers in Kosovo and built schools in Afghanistan. They serve as eve-
rything from medics to social workers, but what they are not, at least in the pub-
lic conscience, are fighters trained to kill other human beings -- and who could 
possibly be killed in the process. They are content to let others do the killing and 
dying while they travel the world as social workers dressed in military fa-
tigues.14 
 
Hence, Germany and similar countries in Western Europe need to 
thread extremely carefully when legitimising its existence and opera-
tions. A small operational mistake of ‘ethical’ nature tends to attract 
significant political consequences at home. The engagement in Af-
ghanistan must therefore be legitimised through ethics of civilian na-
ture, not security. For example, the Chief of the Norwegian Contin-
gent said the following when asked if the deployment was ‘worth it’: 
                                                 
12  There is of course a particular historical reason for this, but similar currents are present 
also in other European countries. 
13  Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Scheer. ‘All the way? The evolution of German military 
power’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, 2008, pp. 211-221. 
14  Konstantin von Hammerstein, Hans Hoyng, Hans-Jürgen Schlamp and Alexander Szan-
dar: ‘NATO Chaos Deepens in Afghanistan: “The Germans Have to Learn How to Kill”’, 
Der Spiegel Online, 20 November 2006,  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,449479,00.html, accessed 15 Novem-
ber 2009. 
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‘Last year 400 000 girls was enrolled in the schools for the first time (…) this 
year 500 000 girls (…) by end 2009 2.5 million girls go to school. The child 
mortality rate is reduced with a quarter since 2002…90 percent of the population 
do today have access to healthcare, while only 10 percent did in 2001….I would 
like to hear someone telling me that 2,5 million girls in school is hopeless’15 
 
The justification for the military operations is thus based on civilian 
progress, not military or even general security. It is furthermore based 
on basic human rights achievements, i.e. ethical topics, which are con-
trasted to the times of the harsh Taliban regime.  
 
The stabilisation approach is also distinguishable from the conven-
tional approach in its legal definition of the adversaries as ‘criminals’ 
not ‘enemies’. While this probably is legally correct,16 the contrast to 
the conventional warfare is obvious. As the adversary is considered a 
criminal and not a conventional enemy, he is not a legal combatant 
according to international law. An enemy combatant can be captured 
or pacified, be a Prisoner of War (PoW), but will retain his military 
rank and identity till the war ends. He is not expected to switch side or 
change his basic identity.17 Criminals on the other hand can and shall 
be reformed, they can serve their time and then in principle be reinte-
grated into society again. The ethical consequences of applying the 
term ‘criminal’ on the adversaries is thus that he can change to the 
better if given a chance. All this is primarily in the Western tradition 
of course, but those are the principles the Western troops have to ad-
here to.  
 
For the identity of the stability approach soldiers this can be confusing 
because it questions what soldiering is about. While the soldier re-
mains ethically superior (in his own identity) to a criminal as he is to 
an enemy, in practice these are not always clear-cut distinctions. There 
are many kinds of criminals, and the spectrum from petty crime to lo-
cal banditry to organised crime to local resistance to international ter-
ror may not be easily drawn. Can all be arrested and reformed? Most 
importantly perhaps, you cannot engage in war with criminals, you 
                                                 
15  ‘- Oppdraget er riktig, bra og verdt stor risiko’ [The Mission was right, good and worth a 
great risk’]¸ Dagbladet, 6 August 2009 (my translation), available on 
http://www.dagbladet.no/2009/08/07/nyheter/innenriks/utenriks/afghanistan/isaf/7543536
/. 
16  From an international law perspective the fighting in Afghanistan is to be defined as a 
non-international or internal war from the moment the Karzai government was inaugu-
rated in June 2002 (before then it was an international war). The same basic legal princi-
ples apply to all three approaches, even if the mandates have evolved over time. See e.g. 
Peace Operations Monitor: http://pom.peacebuild.ca/AfghanistanMandates.shtml, ac-
cessed 15 November 2009. See also State Secretary Espen Barth Eide: Folkeretten og Af-
ghanistan [International Law and Afghanistan] http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/The-
Ministry/Other-political-staff/state-secretary-espen-barth-eide/Speeches-and-
articles/2009/folkeretten-og-afghanistan.html?id=565345, accessed 17 July 2009. 
17  The Bush administration did not recognise Al-Qaida or the Taliban as enemy combatants 
either, though. See e.g. Jane Mayer: ‘Outsourcing Torture The secret history of America’s 
“extraordinary rendition” program’, New Yorker, 14 February 2005, accessed from 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6, 8 February 2010. 
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can only use force in self-defence. Should ISAF engage with all these, 
or only some categories, and where to draw the line between policing 
and soldiering?18  
 
To conclude, the stabilisation approach appears not to be at ease with 
itself, its identity and thus role in Afghanistan. It is partly a soldier in 
denial, partly a police and partly a construction worker. It sees itself as 
an assisting force, which shall help build a self-sustained Afghanistan 
over time. It does not consider itself to have much national interests in 
Afghanistan, it is NATO success, continued solidarity and general 
progress in Afghanistan which are the core issues. The problem how-
ever, is that policing and development rarely is worth dying for. 
The Counter-insurgency Approach 
The third strand within the Military discourse is the counter-
insurgency (COIN) approach. It emerged as a result of the failures of 
the conventional approach where the killing of Taliban soldiers not 
lead to victory. As so often before, winning battles did not equal win-
ning the war. The heavy reliance on airpower led to collateral damage 
and civilian deaths which contributed to alienating the population.19 
Gradually these experiences, plus the turn-over in Iraq, paved the way 
for the COIN doctrine.  
 
From the COIN perspective, the ‘problem’ in Afghanistan continues 
to be the insurgents, but in contrast to the conventional approach they 
are defined not as a one unified or static enemy, but rather as a con-
glomerate of various loosely connected groups, with different motiva-
tions, ideologies and interests.20 Some are considered more hard-line 
than others, and the aim is to marginalise the hardliners and win the 
more moderates over. To do this, the focus shifts from tracking the 
enemies, to undermine their support base. In the latest Counterinsur-
gency Guidance21 from COM ISAF, the COIN principles are clearly 
stated: 
 
 
                                                 
18  See also Donald J. Campbell and Kathleen M. Campbell: ‘Soldiers as Police Offi-
cers/Police Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States’, 
Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 36, No. 2; 2010, pp. 327 – 350. 
19  There are no data on civilian casualties from airstrikes prior to 2005, but several sources 
claims they were high in the most combat affected areas in south-western Afghanistan. 
See also Human Rights Watch: Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Af-
ghanistan, 8 September 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/09/08/troops-contact-
0, accessed 13 November 2009 and Human Rights Watch: Return of the Warlords, 6 June 
2002, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2002/06/06/afghanistan-return-warlords, accessed 
13 November 2009. 
20  See e.g. See COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html, accessed 30 Nov. 2009, p 2-5. 
21  COMISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance (undated)  
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf , accessed 17 
November 2009 
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ISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance: Key Points 
The Afghan people are the Objective. Protecting then is the 
mission. Focus 95% of your time building relationships with 
them and, together with the Afghan government, meeting their 
needs. 
 
Get rid of the conventional mind-set. Focus on the people, not 
the militants. By earning their trust and helping an accountable 
GIRoA gain the support of the people, you take from the en-
emy what he cannot afford to lose – the control of the popula-
tion. 
 
The US adopted a COIN doctrine in 2006 which states that ‘political 
power is the central issue in insurgencies and counter insurgencies; 
each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority 
as legitimate’.22 Hence, the so-called ‘centre of gravity’ in COIN, i.e. 
where on need to concentrate ones effort to achieve results, is there-
fore the attitude of the population. The military, according to the 
COIN approach, cannot win the war in traditional sense, i.e. eliminat-
ing or entirely pacifying the enemy. All it can achieve is to control the 
situation by suppressing the insurgents to such an extent that others 
(civilians) can build a positive peace process. Conversely the military 
has to take extreme caution while conducting kinetic operations, as 
errors or collateral casualties actually may undermine the overall 
strategy (popular support).  
 
Spatially it is still a contest for territorial control. The COIN approach 
is about building legitimacy in the already captured territories. A 
popular summarizing of the COIN tactic is to ‘clear-hold-build’, i.e. 
clear out the insurgents, hold the territory and build sustainable do-
mestic political and security presence. It is therefore more political 
than the stabilisation approach and more careful towards the local 
population in its conduct than the conventional approach. COIN only 
captures territory it can hold and protect. It abandons sweeping cam-
paign or random patrols and focus on building secure areas. The en-
emy is thus clearly defined spatially as outside the areas controlled by 
the COIN soldiers and its local allies.  
 
Furthermore, as the shift changes from the enemy to the ‘rest’, knowl-
edge about the environment, the culture and local customs have be-
come crucial for the soldiers. So-called ‘human terrain teams’ are de-
veloped to better understand the local cultures, economy, politics, re-
ligion and conflicts. Increased awareness of the socio-political impacts 
of own activity (‘who benefits/weakens from the road we build?’) be-
                                                 
22  The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24), Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2007:2 
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comes necessary.23 The ‘battle-space’ thus develops into several lay-
ers or spheres, such as economics, agriculture and infrastructure, and 
the enemy is engaged in all of them. The spatial dimension is there-
fore not only physical space but also non-military sectors of relevance 
for the political struggle taking place.24 This expansive knowledge of, 
and engagement with, the wider society were ignored in the conven-
tional approach.25  
 
The local security forces and authorities play an important role in 
COIN, as the task is to support their standing among the civilian popu-
lation. As in the stabilisation approach, the key aim is to help develop 
a sustainable security situation through institution- or state-building. 
This temporal dimension of development is therefore crucial part of 
the COIN identity. The Afghan civilians, the authorities and the secu-
rity forces are the Others, but not a hostile Other. They are the sub-
jects and centre of gravity for the COIN approach, of which the COIN 
Approach mirrors itself and its own identity. The radical enemy Other, 
the Taliban, looms in the background and threatens to interfere, but 
the very logic of COIN is to degrade them into a secondary position. 
They shall be marginalised in space and in time, and as Afghanistan 
progresses, they are supposed to become less and less attractive and 
relevant for the local population. Over time, as political and economi-
cal marginalisation increases, former hostile tribes and groups are ex-
pected to seek to come to terms with the new Afghanistan, and will 
either succumb, negotiate or gradually integrate into the wider society. 
COIN is therefore built on a premise of change and progress for ordi-
nary people. 
 
The reduced focus on the enemy also has implications on the ethical 
dimension. Since the COIN doctrine is primarily American, the focus 
on the Taliban and the Al-Qaida has far from vanished from the politi-
cal debates. However, in the Military Discourse the failure of the con-
ventional approach and the emergence of COIN approach have shifted 
the emphasis away from the ethical dimension in the sense that there 
is less focus on ‘evil’ and ‘barbarian’ enemy as a contrast to the mor-
ally superior US soldiers. The dichotomy of good/bad has waned and 
legitimacy is instead built on American soldiers as ‘good-doers’ and 
not only as heroic and just warriors. The ethics have therefore shifted 
closer to the stabilisation approach, where assisting the locals becomes 
more central. As in the stabilisation approach the Other is the unedu-
cated but friendly Afghan solider which can be developed and trained 
into a certain modern standard. Success in COIN is largely measured 
                                                 
23  David Kilcullen: The Accidental Guerilla, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
24  See The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24):156. 
25  For an analysis of the flaws of conventional intelligence in Afghanistan, see Michael T. 
Flynn, Matt Pottinger and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelli-
gence Relevant in Afghanistan, Washington: Center for a New American Study, 2010. 
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in success in training and equipping local forces, and of making them 
capable of ‘holding’ territory and keep the Taliban at bay.  
Conclusion: the Military Discourse 
The three approaches within the military discourse represents three 
ways of applying military force, it represents three distinct military 
identities. Along the three dimensions, the spatial, temporal and the 
ethical, one can discern the evolution of three conflicting or overlap-
ping identities. That means that they perceive Afghanistan differently, 
consider their task in Afghanistan differently. 
 
The conventional approach operates with a simplified us/them dichot-
omy and largely ignores the wider environment (local and interna-
tional actors). The role of the soldier is very clear though, he is there 
to kill or capture the enemy and destroy his infrastructure. He is at 
war, and comprehensive approach and cooperation with civilians is 
logically not a priority. 
 
The stabilisation approach has a rather opposite position. It consider 
the adversaries to be criminals and own role to assist the Afghan secu-
rity forces in incapacitating them. Deadly force is thus reserved for 
self-defence. Much of the focus is on the non-military aspects of the 
presence in Afghanistan (supporting development). While often hav-
ing a good understanding of the social environment they are in, the 
Self-perception is somewhat vague; partly military, partly police, 
partly mentor, partly reconstruction worker. The stabilisation ap-
proach is itself positive to cooperation with civilians, but as we shall 
see below, typically meets resistance from the civilian actors when 
reaching out. 
 
The COIN approach also has a sophisticated understanding of the lo-
cal environment. It recognises the political link between activity of 
Self and the potential radicalisation of the Other. The Self is thus a 
constrained soldier, which shall refrain from excessive use of force, 
and turn away from the enemy and instead focus on the well-being of 
the civilian population. The COIN approach cannot succeed with mili-
tary means alone, it requires civilian cooperation to prevail. If nobody 
can ‘build’ while the military ‘hold’, COIN will fail. Comprehensive 
approach or ‘unity of effort’ is therefore a necessity.  
 
These three military identities coexist in the current military discourse 
in Afghanistan. It is likely to cause confusion and dysfunctionality 
within the military discourse, within ISAF, as the three have different 
perceptions of why they are there, what they are to do, how to do it 
and with whom. The COIN approach has become very ‘trendy’ over 
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the last years, but it also appears to be a far cry from the theoretical 
concepts to the reality on the ground. Also, while on paper most open 
to civilian cooperation of all three strands, it also presupposes that the 
civilian actors have the very same counter-insurgency priorities and 
objectives. That is not the case today. 
The Humanitarian Discourse 
The differences between the military to the humanitarian discourse are 
striking. Humanitarians typically operate in small NGO’s, have a 
strong humanitarian ideology and personal engagement in relieving 
civilian suffering, live close to the people they help and have limited 
resources. There is however, a wide range of actors who identify 
themselves as part of this camp, including governmental agencies (e.g. 
USAID, SIDA and DFID) and intergovernmental agencies (e.g. 
OCHA, UNHCR and ECHO). There are therefore some tensions 
within this discourse, and between NGOs, GOs and IGOs about the 
very identity and meaning of civilian engagement in Afghanistan. Is it 
primarily to relieve human suffering or is it rather to contribute the 
resolution of the conflict? How is one to relate to other actors, in par-
ticular the international military but also the local authorities? This 
discourse is about the identity of the Humanitarian Self. 
 
As the ethical dimension is by far the most significant for the humani-
tarian identity formation, let us address that first. The humanitarian 
actors have a long history of operating in dangerous situations. The 
most prominent example is the International Committee and Federa-
tion of the Red Cross (IFRC/ICRC), which during the industrial wars 
of the 20th century operated between the trenches helping civilians and 
wounded soldiers indiscriminately of the colours of their uniforms. 
This tradition has continued till today, and their and many other or-
ganisations approach and philosophy of work is embedded in the In-
ternational Humanitarian Law (IHL).  
 
This ‘humanitarian imperative’, often summarised as ‘independence, 
impartiality and neutrality’ has been the driving force which also has 
been put down into a shared document, the ‘Red Cross Code of Con-
duct’ where these are the four first Principle Commitments:26  
 
1. The Humanitarian imperative comes first. 
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nation-
ality of the recipients and without adverse distinc-
                                                 
26  Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs 
in Disaster Relief, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
1995. 
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tion of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the 
basis of need alone. 
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political 
or religious standpoint. 
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of 
government foreign policy. 
 
The identity of the humanitarian worker is strongly embedded in these 
principles. Independence, impartiality and neutrality is the common 
denominator for a whole range of otherwise different NGO’s from 
which they define a common Self. 
 
The self-perception of these humanitarian NGOs is one of ‘purity’, 
‘morality’, responsibility’, ‘solidarity’, ‘understanding of the local 
context/culture’, etc. The suffering civilian population (and sometimes 
the military) is their subject, and therefore also their Other. The exis-
tence of people in need is a precondition for the existence of the hu-
manitarian actors, and thus their Self identity. However, the humani-
tarian discourse typically sees itself to be closely connected to these 
Others, particularly if they are victims of war and atrocities. The 
closeness with the victims, the rough conditions they themselves live 
in while in the theatre, as well as the voluntary and altruistic element 
of the work, all build up on this ethical dimension of the Self identity.  
 
The ethical dimension is under pressure though, as it is based on a 
premise of respect and recognition of the neutrality from the warring 
parties. There have been an increased targeting and killing of humani-
tarian workers in Afghanistan the last years. Many voices in the hu-
manitarian discourse accuse the military actors of being responsible 
for this (see below), but this has also to do with the nature of many of 
today’s conflicts. The notion of ‘independence, impartiality and neu-
trality’ is harder to sustain when the population often is the subject or 
a deliberate target of a war. Even ‘neutral’ facilities such as food and 
water may be considered a political intervention by some of the wor-
rying parties, such as local warlords or the Taliban. In certain places it 
is literally impossible to be neutral, as any engagement with the civil-
ian population will be considered as political interference by some of 
the local actors. Targeting of humanitarian actors may therefore at 
times be a result of this, irrespectively of the interference of military 
actors in the humanitarian field. If Others do not recognise your iden-
tity as being of a non-political nature, your Self identity will quickly 
be weakened as well. This is a major challenge for the humanitarian 
discourse. 
 
We see this also in the spatial dimension of the Humanitarian Dis-
course which not is about the control of territory, but about a concep-
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tual space, called the ‘humanitarian space’. Since the 1990’s the use of 
force has been increasingly legitimised on humanitarian grounds, 
through concepts such as ‘humanitarian interventions’, ‘Protection of 
Civilians’ and ‘Responsibility to Protect’. This is sometimes wel-
comed by the humanitarian community, who actively call for interven-
tions to prevent genocides and war crimes. However, the entrance of 
the security actors into the humanitarian and development sector has 
also angered many, who fear that humanitarian assistance and devel-
opment becomes a sub-set of a security strategy rather than a humani-
tarian needs-driven effort.27 When military forces in addition have be-
gun distributing humanitarian aid to win ‘hearts and minds’ and to 
gain intelligence, the tensions have risen.  
 
ISAFs Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), have been a particu-
lar target for this criticism, as they have a range of civilian develop-
ment personnel embedded in a predominantly military unit. This blurs 
the distinction between the humanitarian actors and the military, and 
represents a politication of aid, it is argued. As a result the neutrality is 
severely undermined and therefore also the security of civilian aid 
agencies which rely on trust of the population to be able to work in 
volatile areas.28 The humanitarians are thus demanding that this ‘hu-
manitarian space’ is left unpoliticised, both for ethical reasons and for 
the sake of the security of the aid workers.  
 
The ‘humanitarian space’ is therefore an imaginary neutral ‘no mans 
land’, like the ground between the front lines or the trenches in World 
War One. The very identity of the humanitarian actors rests on the ex-
istence of such a space. If it were to disappear, everything will be po-
litical, including humanitarian aid. The white flag would lose its 
meaning. That is why it is so fiercely defended by the humanitarian 
community.  
 
In a time when the trench wear ha been replaced by a ‘war amongst 
the people’,29 the humanitarian space cannot any more be physically 
located and must be defended conceptually instead. There are many 
Others or threats to this dimension of the humanitarian identity: 
 
Certain humanitarian actors go far in accusing the military and its ‘in-
terference in their field’ for being the main challenge they encounter 
in the theatres they operate in. Statements such as ’it was easier during 
                                                 
27  Stephen Cornish and Marit Glad, Civil-military relations: No Rooom for Humanitarian-
ism in comprehensive approaches, Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Security 
Policy Library No. 5, 2008. 
28  Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer (eds.), Resetting the rules of engagement. Trends and 
issues in the military-humanitarian relations, London: Humanitarian Policy Group HPG, 
2006, p. 49. 
29  Rupert Smith, The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world, New York, Knopf, 
2007. 
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Taliban’30 indicates that they consider the international military to be 
the main problem in Afghanistan, not the Taliban. They thus accuse 
the military of creating more problems than they resolve, due to col-
lateral damage and insensitive behaviour, while simultaneously put-
ting others (the humanitarians) in danger. In this respect the military is 
not only an Other but also a dangerous or threatening Other for the 
humanitarian Self.  
 
Yet other humanitarian actors have resisted to be part of UNs inte-
grated mission concept, and fought to keep OCHA physically separate 
from UNAMA, arguing that OCHA and thereby the humanitarian 
community would be politicised by being co-located with the more 
political UNAMA Mission (which is run on a UNSC mandate).31 
While the military represents a threat by their military activity, the UN 
does it by politicising the aid. UNAMA and other non-humanitarian 
UN organisations is therefore also Others in this view, actors that one 
needs to keep at an arms length’ distance to affirm the humanitarian 
identity.  
 
However, the humanitarian space is also sometimes threatened from 
within the humanitarian discourse, when actors seek to stretch the 
humanitarian space to also include development projects. It is not un-
common that humanitarian actors are engaged in both humanitarian 
and developmental work. The latter, being (re-)construction, capacity 
building, education etc., provides a community with resources and ca-
pacities. It has a social impact and beneficiaries beyond mere survival 
and is therefore political. This is sometimes ignored in the discourse 
and development is conflated with humanitarian work. Such protec-
tion of the ‘NGO-space’32, i.e. everything the NGOs does, has no 
foundation in the IHL, but is nonetheless defended in some NGO cir-
cles. The consequence is potentially that the humanitarian identity is 
undermined from within. 
 
The humanitarian identity is also formed in the temporal dimension. 
Aid and humanitarian relief have an inherent element of progress in it, 
as it is aimed at helping people out of a state of humanitarian crisis. 
However, humanitarian work is not development work, and is in prin-
ciple only redeeming suffering, not addressing its causes. As dis-
cussed above, in principle the humanitarians cannot engage in the 
                                                 
30  The Norwegian Refugee Council has e.g. stated that it was easier to do aid work during 
Taliban than now, ’Lettere under Taliban’ [Easier under Taliban], ABCNyheter, 28 De-
cember 2009, www.abcnyheter.no/node/10226, accessed 29 December 2009.  
31  The need for an independent OCHA in Afghanistan, open letter to Mr. Bo Asplund, d. 
SRSG – RRR, Resident Representative for the UNDP and Humanitarian Coordinator, 
from 19 NGOs, 4 April 2008, accessed from 
www.unamagroups.org/NeedforindependentOCHAfromNGOs-04040.pdf, 23 September 
2009. 
32  Sylvian Beauchamp, Defining the Humanitarian Space Through Public International 
Law, 2008:16, available at http://www.redcross.ca/cmslib/general/obeoc_beauchamp.pdf  
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long-term questions unless they are of a non-political nature (which is 
rare in civil wars). The humanitarians can therefore be said to work 
around or in a conflict and not on it.33 Their identity Others, i.e. the 
recipients of aid, will therefore continue to be so only as long as there 
is a need to fill. When there is no longer a humanitarian need, they 
will cease to be the Other, and the humanitarians go elsewhere. The 
temporal dimension is therefore rather short-sighted, measurable in 
human survival, access to basic needs and nutrition levels.  
 
However, as mentioned above, humanitarian actors often engage in 
development programmes as well. In these cases they are deeply em-
bedded in a temporal dimension of human progress, modernisation, 
poverty reduction and development. Many NGO’s are also carrying 
out work defined and funded by national donors, some aimed at tradi-
tional development, others as a part of an overarching security agenda. 
These quasi-NGO’s or ‘quangos’34 are also by their nature challenging 
the humanitarian discourse, at least when they claim to remain non-
political and neutral. Development aid cannot be non-political. 
 
Here the government-funded agencies such as the United States 
Agency for International Aid (USAID) development programme go 
one step further as they explicitly state that they working together with 
the armed forces to promote stability and human security to curb in-
surgencies: ‘As long-term development cannot take hold in an unsta-
ble environment, USAID also supports the joint Afghan-U.S. Gov-
ernment Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategy…’.35 
 
These and other government aid agencies see itself as part of the over-
arching political process in Afghanistan, and are more likely to see the 
military as partners and the Taliban as the Other. 36 The meaning of 
their engagement is to contribute to the political struggle for a stable 
Afghanistan, and the main challenger to the order represented by the 
elected government in Kabul, is the Taliban. Their Self is therefore 
embedded in a belief that the development of a Western-like, liberal-
democratic/economic society is the best bulwark against terrorists and 
politico-religious extremist.  
 
                                                 
33  Jonathan Goodhand with Philippa Atkinson: Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuild-
ing Impact of International Engagement, London: International Alert, 2001, p. 7. 
34  See Christopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot (eds.), Unbundled Government: A Critical 
Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation, London: 
Routledge, 2004. 
35  USAID/Afghanistan Strategy, 
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.CountryOverview.aspx, accessed 5 February 2010. 
See also Elisabeth Kvitashvili: ‘Promoting Stability & Human Security in the Context of 
“Irregular Warfare”’, Liaison, 4, 2008. 
36  Japan, for example, promotes its civilian aid as: Japan’s Contribution to Afghanistan - 
Working on the frontline in the war on terrorism, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/pamph0703.pdf, accessed 5 February 
2010. 
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The engagement of development actors and government agencies with 
a political agenda is often considered a threat to the humanitarian 
identity, but this is also because the discourse itself has stretched be-
yond its initial platform. Being explicitly political also indicate a Self-
awareness of own power, influence and role, which may be lacking in 
the ‘quangos’. Development and neutrality never was compatible, par-
ticularly in the politically strenuous environment in Afghanistan. The 
temporal dimension is therefore very problematic for the humanitarian 
identity. In principle the notion of development and progress should 
be almost relatively irrelevant for the humanitarian identity, but in 
practice it is very much present – and may therefore also undermine 
the other dimensions.  
Conclusion: The Humanitarian Discourse 
The humanitarian discourse is full of internal tensions as well as pres-
sure form the outside. The Afghan theatre is complex and requires a 
delicate balance between IHL principles and situational realities. As 
the ‘trench war’ has been replaced with ‘war amongst the people’ the 
humanitarian discourse is in a struggle over its identity. 
 
Some strands of the discourse seek to purify the neutral, humanitarian 
identity, working only in or around the conflict, not on it. For these 
comprehensive approach is not an issue, they shy it as much as the 
conventional warrior. Others seek to strike a balance between neutral 
humanitarian work and political developmental work, something 
which is a demanding exercise not least since others (local population 
as well as the military) may have another perception than those inside 
the discourse. But they may pragmatically engage with political actors 
like the UN, and sometimes even the military. The third group, the 
explicitly political actors may be better able to define their identity, 
and is open to cooperation, but will nonetheless often resist leadership 
from outside the discourse, particularly from the military.  
The State-building Discourse 
The State-building discourse in Afghanistan is the process of estab-
lishing a political system and institutions after the fall of Taliban in 
2001. Through international political conferences in places such as 
Bonn, London and Paris, the Afghanistan institutions were designed, 
and the direction forward pointed out.37 The State-building discourse 
rests on an assumption of ‘liberal peace’, i.e. that liberal societies with 
                                                 
37  These were in 2001, 2006 and 2008 respectively. In addition major international political 
and donor conferences were held in Bonn and Brussels in 2001, Tokyo, Petersberg and 
Geneva in 2002, Brussels in 2003, Kabul in 2005, Wilton Park in 2005 and 2007, Rome 
2007, the Hague in 2009 and London again in 2010, to mention some. Note that only one 
of these conferences were actually held in Afghanistan. 
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democracy and marked economy neither go to war against each other 
nor suppress their own citizens and thus create political instability and 
extremism.38 The State-building discourse is based primarily on estab-
lished UN peace-building principles, poverty-reduction and the Mil-
lennium Goals. Security, stability or resisting insurgents is not the 
primary objective. As a result perhaps, this process is primarily run by 
the UN and a few European states, while the US has stayed in the 
background. Again I will analyse the State-building discourse and the 
identity of the actors engaged in it through the spatial, temporal and 
ethical dimensions. 
 
In the spatial dimension, the initial instinct from the UN and Europe 
was that one not should build huge international state-building mis-
sions in Afghanistan similar to those of the 1990’s in Bosnia and East 
Timor. Criticism had emerged that these missions not were successful 
in building neither peace nor local commitment and ownership.39 
Hence, this time the recipe for the UN was a ‘light footprint’. The in-
ternational community should engage mainly through ‘facilitation, 
advice and subtle interventions’,40 while the majority of the recon-
struction tasks should be taken care of by the Afghans themselves. In 
this discourse the Others are the Afghans, located in Afghanistan, 
whereas the Self is the wider international community who met them 
in international conferences, but otherwise kept physical distance. 
 
The state-building discourse was initiated by the Bonn conference in 
December 2001, shortly after the fall of the Taliban.41 The ambitions 
were high: ‘to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote na-
tional reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human 
rights’. In practice however, the aim of the Bonn process was to (re-) 
establish the basic state institutions and to get a legitimate central 
government in place. The Bonn document itself is relatively sober 
reading in this regard, with clear and achievable objectives. It created 
a road-map towards establishing an Emergency Loya Jirga, Interim 
Authority, Transitional Authority, Constitutional Loya Jirga, and later 
on, the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005.  
 
                                                 
38  See e.g. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh: ‘Conflicted Outcomes and Values: (Neo)Liberal Peace 
in Central Asia and Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping Vol. 16, No. 5 2009, and 
‘Liberal Peace Building and the Challenges to Enhance State Legitimacy’, at 
http://www.sak.se/arkiv/artiklar/artiklar/2009/peace/tadjbakhsh.pdf, accessed 6 February 
2010; and for a general criticism of the ‘liberal peace’, see Special Issue ‘ Liberal Peace-
building Reconstructed’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2009. 
39  Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding 
and Peacebuilding, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009; David Chandler: Bos-
nia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, London: Pluto Press 2002. 
40  Christopher Freeman, ’Introduction: Security, Governance and Statebuilding in Afghani-
stan’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007:1. 
41  See http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm, accessed 5 October 
2009. 
The Politics of the Comprehensive Approach  25 
However, the Western actors also wanted to make sure Afghanistan 
got off on the ‘right’ track, making the de facto engagement in design-
ing the democratic institutions rather strong. As a result, the ‘entire 
government functions were (…) being assumed by international actors 
during the Bonn Process, including the arrangement of presidential 
and parliamentary elections…’42 So on the one hand the international 
actors stressed the importance of the ‘light footprint’ and local owner-
ship, on the other hand they had strong interests in how Afghanistan 
should develop politically and made sure to have at least one hand 
each on the steering wheel.  
 
Nevertheless, at this stage progress had clearly been made, the Consti-
tution was passed and many institutions were formally established, 
such as the Transitional Administration, Judicial Commission, the 
Central bank and new a currency, and not least the Afghan National 
Army and the Afghan National Police. The key elements of a new 
(potential) Afghan Self were established. 
 
The next step in the state-building discourse was the Berlin conference 
in 2004, prior to the first elections. This is also the stage when the am-
bitions expanded and when the temporal dimension becomes more 
visible. Until now, while there were clear international developmental 
ambitions hidden in the discourse, it had also been largely about build-
ing the very basic Afghan institutions, with at least a flavour of an Af-
ghan identity, local ownership and culture (Loya Jirga etc). Now the 
state-building ambitions were accelerated, Afghanistan was to develop 
much further towards a liberal democracy, and the identity of the 
Western State-builders was reaffirmed. 
 
Where the 2001 Berlin document is narrow in scope, the 2004 docu-
ment expands into several other areas. Under the heading Good Gov-
ernance and Public Administration it lists a range of plans regarding 
reform of the ministries, Civil Service law, merit-based recruitment, 
re-training of staff, Code of Conduct etc. This trend was reinforced in 
the 2006 London conference, which created the so-called Afghanistan 
Compact.43 The Afghan Compact covers more or less all aspects of a 
comprehensive state-building, including security forces, counter-
narcotics, public administration, statistics, gender, rule of law, land 
registration, infrastructure, environment, agriculture, health, refugee-
return and finance, to mention some. It also lists benchmarks and 
timetables in all these sectors. All the objectives are to be achieved 
                                                 
42  Christopher Freeman, 2007:1. 
43  See Afghanistan Compact,  
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/AfghanistanCompact-
English.pdf, and Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Executive Summary, 
http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/ANDS%20Executive%20Summary_eng
.pdf p.2, accessed 30 September 2009. 
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between 2006 and 2011, which by all standards must be considered an 
overly optimistic estimate. This includes vetting procedures and per-
formance-based reviews’ in the civil service by 2010 and anti-
corruption legislation in line with UN commitments by end 2006, just 
to mention two. The benchmarks appear to be based on a generic list 
of things to do to achieve good governance and human rights, with 
little reference to the specific needs and challenges of Afghanistan. It 
looks like a shopping list of good deeds, not a bottom-up analysis of 
the needs of this specific country. This indicates that the Afghan 
Compact is largely designed and written by the UN and other interna-
tional actors, i.e. by outsiders but who had limited knowledge about, 
or interest in, the real-world challenges these benchmarks would face. 
 
Furthermore, due to the ‘light footprint’ approach,44 the discrepancy 
between these ambitions and the delivery in the field is considerable. 
Neither UNAMA nor the Afghan government was ever given enough 
resources to implement the ambitious plans, nor have they been deliv-
ered through third parties. In the UNAMA SRSG’s words: ‘Much of it 
has been said and written – and even agreed solemnly at international 
conferences over and over again. But it has not been implemented’.45  
 
So what have been done in practice? It is a challenge to make an esti-
mate or an overview over the degree of implementation of the oral and 
written commitments (what may be called the materiality of the dis-
course). The myriad of actors engaged, limited coordination and lack 
of transparency makes exact numbers of development aid hard to 
come by. However, some rough estimates can be found from OECD, 
the World Bank and NGO networks. Firstly, it is generally acknowl-
edged that about international assistance constitutes around 90% of 
the public expenditure in Afghanistan. Still, in the first two years of 
the intervention, Afghanistan received only $57 annually per capita 
whilst in comparison Iraq received $206, East Timor $233, Kosovo 
$526 and Bosnia-Hercegovina $679 per capita respectively.46 Not 
only are the numbers low, but out of the $25 billion committed by in-
ternational donors for reconstruction and development from 2001 to 
2008, only $15 billion has been actually spent. For the period 2002-
2011 $39 billion has been pledged, but so far (2008) less than 40% has 
been spent, according to the umbrella-NGO ACBAR. At the same 
time, two-thirds of the foreign aid is bypassing the Afghan govern-
ment, thus undermining efforts to build strong state institutions. This 
                                                 
44  As well as other distractions, like the Iraq war. 
45  SRSG Briefing to the Security Council, 29 September 2009, 
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/SRSG%20Briefing%20to%20SC/09sept29
-security-council.pdf , accessed 1 October 2009. 
46  See The UN’s Role in Nation-Building – From the Congo to Iraq, Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand Corporation 2005:238ff. 
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particularly applies to the regional government institutions outside 
Kabul.  
 
Even worse, ACBAR finds that about 40% of the funds spent have 
returned to the donor countries in corporate profits and consultant 
salaries.47 There is also minimal transparency in procurement and ten-
dering, and none of the benchmarks in the Afghan Compact are for 
donors, only for the Afghan government.  
 
The State-building discourse has thus been full of words and pledges 
but not much action. The extremely high ambitions indicate a dis-
course largely detached from the realities on the ground, and the lim-
ited resources spent indicate a limited understanding or interest in the 
Afghan problems. The international state-building Self is largely ab-
sent from the Afghan people, it communicates with the international 
UN and diplomatic circles, but it often creates huge unfulfilled expec-
tations and political failures on the ground. It has reaffirmed an inter-
national liberal Western Self, disguised as genuine Afghan desires and 
universal UN standards. Ironically the failure of the Afghans to meet 
these high expectations, to transform from an underdeveloped to a 
modern state, reinforce and confirm the Western Self and its perceived 
need to continue to assist Afghanistan. 
 
If we look at this process through the lenses of the ethical dimension, 
the same pattern is reaffirmed. The ambitions are high, based on moral 
and presumably universal values, as represented by the UN and other 
international state-building actors. The ethical Other is the Afghan in-
stitutions, legislation and value system which is to become liberated 
and liberalised. The language in all the mentioned declarations put 
huge emphasis on the importance of liberal values such as good gov-
ernance, gender and women’s rights, anti-corruption, education, hu-
man rights etc. The benchmarks lists e.g. separate juvenile and women 
prisons by 2010 and a National Action Plan for Women to be fully 
implemented, also by 2010. But there is hardly any reference to Af-
ghan traditions, positive and negative developments, particular obsta-
cles or priorities. Also, the liberal idea of local ownership often aban-
doned, e.g. when the Afghans step ‘out of line’ and pass laws that run 
                                                 
47  According to the ‘Afghanistan Compact Procurement Monitoring Project’, in the period 
March 2005 to March 2006, the official development assistance (ODA) to Afghanistan 
was $1.5 billion. But of this only about 31% had any local economic impact, i.e. used to 
buy locally produced Afghan goods and services. The report finds that funds channelled 
through international companies or NGO’s only had a 20% local economic impact. Funds 
provided directly to the local authorities (through e.g. trust funds) on the other hand, had 
an impact on about 85%. Still, in total only 25% of the aid went to the trust funds, 58% to 
international companies or NGOs and 15% to UN agencies.  
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counter to the liberal values of the State-building discourse. Then 
Western political actors quickly interfere to prevent it.48 
 
Despite this the State-building discourse typically considers itself a 
positive force with no political agenda, only assisting in the imple-
mentation of ‘universal’ values. These are typically UN human rights’ 
documents which are formally recognised by the Afghan authorities, 
but which not is recognised outside the liberal circles in Kabul. The 
Western State-builders tend to ignore the political role they play also 
in the ethical dimension while promoting liberal values.  
Conclusion: State-building Discourse 
The presumption of the State-building discourse is that the Afghan 
Other, through the development of liberal state institutions, can be-
come more like the Western Self over time. The role of the Self is to 
assist this transformation. But the State-building discourse has simul-
taneously demanded and denied the Afghans local ownership of the 
political process. One the one hand it has been declared that the Af-
ghans themselves should do the bulk of the work in the creation of 
their own state, and that the international community should only 
‘oversee’, ‘facilitate’ or ‘assist’ the process from the outside. On the 
other hand, to ‘make sure’ this process goes as it ‘should’, the dis-
course has been deeply embedded in indirect rule. It is talked about 
liberal rights, sovereignty and freedom, but there is also constant illib-
eral interference in the Afghan institutions and political life. The 
whole range of requirements, expectations, milestones and demands of 
the authorities, keeps it tightly in control of the Western State-building 
actors, who also keep full de facto control of the finances of the state. 
 
Hence, the State-building Self appears to be an outsider with limited 
own interests, a well-intended assistant, aimed at modernising and de-
veloping Afghanistan. It is, to borrow a term from David Chandler, an 
‘empire in denial’,49 a Self perception of a de-politicised helper, in de-
nial of own power and influence and with no accountability towards 
the Afghan population.  
 
For the State-building discourse modernity is the future, the ‘violent 
and barbarian past’ embodied as the Taliban is the Other from which 
Afghanistan must be saved. The Taliban Other is defined entirely out 
of the discourse and is nonexistent as a political player. Through state-
building one is to ensure that they remain marginalised and never re-
                                                 
48  See ’Pressure on Hamid Karzai to scrap Afghan women’s law’, The Guardian, 1 April 
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/01/afghanistan-womens-rights-hamid-
karzai, accessed 1 October 2009. 
49  David Chandler, Empire in Denial: the Politics of State-building, London, Pluto Press, 
2006. 
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turn. The question is however, if one can get rid of a political-cultural 
actor through institution- and state-building. Can Afghanistan be ex-
pected to become a liberal state in the foreseeable future, or will Tali-
ban or other non-liberal actors continue to be a political factor that 
needs to be taken into account? The State-building discourse appears 
to have ignored real-world politics and the so-called realities on the 
ground, and built a generic concept that has reinforced the identity of 
the Self but fell short on transforming the Other.  
 
Lastly, the State-building discourse in its introvert and largely Euro-
pean focus appears to be relatively ignorant of the Humanitarian and 
Military discourses. Both security and humanitarian needs are integral 
parts of all the state-building documents, but state-building sphere it is 
nonetheless a field executed in separation from the others. There is 
e.g. no reflection of a COIN tactic in the state-building discourse, even 
if the former relies on political settlements to succeed. The ANDS has 
become a standard point of reference on the development and humani-
tarian projects, but the Kabul government has limited influence of its 
implementation. Furthermore, the State-building discourse focuses 
predominantly on the central government, and less on the rural prov-
inces where both the Humanitarian and the Military actors operate. 
The common ground for a comprehensive approach is thus limited. 
Conclusion 
The three discourses analysed in this paper meet in the same physical 
space, the (post)war theatre, but appears at times to be at three differ-
ent conceptual and perceptional planets. Their view of themselves and 
their roles, as well as the view of the local actors and the main reason 
for being in Afghanistan, differ significantly. In addition there are 
striking differences within the discourses, several strands with com-
peting visions and identities of own role and vision, Lastly there is 
often a huge gap between words and deeds, in all three discourses.  
 
The power struggles or competing world-views are most visible in the 
Military and the Humanitarian discourses, which both are struggling 
with coming to terms with their role in the (post)war theatres. The 
transition from conventional ‘trench-war’ to ‘war amongst the people’ 
has complicated roles which used to be clear-cut, and forced them 
both to re-define themselves.  
 
The Humanitarian discourse actively seeks to prevent other actors 
from entering their ‘humanitarian space’, whereas COIN discourse 
appears to expand way beyond the military sector. The Humanitarian 
discourse, in its most puritan version, seeks to elevate itself above the 
politics of the (post)war theatre. The State-building discourse is also 
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consider it self to be more technical than political by building institu-
tions, but it fails to recognise what enormous constraints it puts on the 
Afghan authorities. It is a neo-colonial ‘empire in denial’. What is 
worse is that despite the enormous political interference, the amount 
of money spent on political projects is rather modest, with limited im-
pact and with large chunks returning to the donor country.  
 
The West is far from ‘one’ in Afghanistan. Perhaps it never was ‘one’ 
when operating in war-torn operations overseas, but there is reason to 
suspect that the ambiguous and volatile situations that characterise the 
(post)war theatre exacerbates the differences further. The instruments 
applied, being military, humanitarian and state-building appears to be 
designed for another task in another time. The military does not have 
its equivalent adversary, the difference between civilians, militaries 
and criminals are being blurred, confusing both military and humani-
tarian actors. The conflicting politics in the theatre are being ad-
dressed by imposing our Western political institutions, the rule of law, 
government and administration, but they appear to be designed more 
to meet abstract international standards than to resolve the conflicts in 
Afghanistan. 
 
The purpose of this paper was to illuminate the – at times – strikingly 
different approaches to the engagement in the same theatre. Calls for a 
comprehensive approach in crisis management which ignores these 
differences are unlikely to succeed. There are, however, developments 
and power-struggles taking place within each discourse which could 
alter the picture as it looks today. New identities may emerge over 
time. A more thorough analysis of each discourse’s basic premises, 
the underlying philosophy, mandates and traditions, as well as the 
limitations, the unspoken topics, may provide for a detailed analysis of 
the key challenges and possibilities to achieve increased coherence. If 
successful, it could contribute in opening new political spaces for co-
operation which today are closed by the frames of each respective dis-
course. This paper is only scratching the surface.  
 
 
